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Abstract
The article conceives international (or global) constitutionalism as a legal argument which
recommends and strengthens efforts (legal and political) to compensate for ongoing de-
constitutionalization on the domestic level. Although the notions ‘international constitution’
and ‘international constitutionalism’ have in recent years served as buzzwords in various
discourses, the many meanings of those concepts have not yet been fully explored and disen-
tangled. This paper suggests a specific understanding of those concepts. It highlights various
aspects and elements of micro- and macro-constitutionalization in international law, and
identifies anti-constitutionalist trends. On this basis, the paper finds that, although no inter-
national constitution in a formal sense exists, fundamental norms in the international legal
order do fulfil constitutional functions. Because those norms can reasonably be qualified as
having a constitutional quality, theymay not be summarily discarded in the event of a conflict
with domestic constitutional law. Because the relevant norms form a transnational constitu-
tional network, and cannot be aligned in an abstract hierarchy, conflict resolution requires
a balancing of interests in concrete cases. Finally, because constitutionalism historically and
prescriptively means asking for a legitimate constitution, a constitutionalist reading of the
international legal order provokes the question of its legitimacy. This question is pressing,
because state sovereignty and consent are – on good grounds – no longer accepted as the sole
source of legitimacy of international law. International constitutionalism – as understood in
thispaper–doesnotask for state-like formsof legitimacyofaworldgovernment,but stimulates
the search for newmechanisms to strengthen the legitimacy of global governance.
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1. THE THESIS: DOMESTIC DE-CONSTITUTIONALIZATION DUE TO
GLOBALIZATION SHOULD AND COULD BE COMPENSATED FOR BY
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
My basic proposition is that the old idea of an international constitution of the in-
ternational legal community1 deserves reconsideration in the light of globalization.
This proposition can build on the work of scholars who have been arguing that
the structure of international law has generally evolved from coexistence via co-
operation (a` laWolfgang Friedman) to constitutionalization.2
In the era of globalization, a constitutionalist reconstruction is a desirable reac-
tion to visible de-constitutionalization on the domestic level. The phenomenon of
globalization, that is, the appearance of global, de-territorialized problems and the
emergence of global networks in thefields of economy, science, politics, and law, has
increased global interdependence. Globalization puts the state and state constitu-
tions under strain: global problems compel states to co-operatewithin international
organizations and through bilateral and multilateral treaties. Previously, typically
governmental functions, such as guaranteeing human security, freedom, and equal-
ity, are inpart transferred to ‘higher’ levels.Moreover, non-state actors (actingwithin
states or even in a transboundary fashion) are increasingly entrusted with the exer-
cise of traditional state functions, even with core tasks such as military and police
activity.3 Theresultof thesemultiplephenomena is that ‘governance’ (understoodas
the overall process of regulating and ordering issues of public interest4) is exercised
beyond the states’ constitutional confines. This means that state constitutions can
no longer regulate the totality of governance in a comprehensive way, and the state
constitutions’ original claim to form a complete basic order is thereby defeated. The
hollowing out of national constitutions affects not only the constitutional principle
of democracy, but also the rule of law and the principle of social security. Overall,
state constitutions are no longer ‘total constitutions’. In consequence,we should ask
for compensatory constitutionalization on the international plane. Only the various levels
of governance, taken together, can provide full constitutional protection.5
1. See, seminally, A. Verdross,Die Verfassung der Vo¨lkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926), Preface.
2. See for an excellent and critical historical overview of the various ‘schools’ and lines of thought describing
and/or propagating an international constitution and constitutionalization H. Ruiz Fabri and C. Grewe, ‘La
constitutionnalisation a` l’e´preuve du droit international et du droit europe´en’, in L. Gard et al. (eds.), Les
dynamiques du droit europe´en en de´but de sie`cle, Etudes en l’honneur de Jean-Claude Gautron (2004), at 189–206. See
for important recent articulations, albeit in very different perspectives, J. Habermas, ‘Hat die Konstitutional-
isierung des Vo¨lkerrechts noch eine Chance?’, in J. Habermas,Der gespalteneWesten: Kleine politische Schriften
(2004), 113–93; E. de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’, (2006) 55 ICLQ 51–76; R. MacDonald
and D. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community
(2005).
3. In US-occupied Iraq of 2003–4, employees of federal contractors and sub-contractors (Blackwater USA, Kroll
Inc., Custer Battles, the Titan corporation, and others) worked asmercenaries, police, guards, prison officers,
and interrogators.
4. J. N. Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’, in J. N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds.),
Governance Without Government (1992) 1, at 7: ‘Governance’, as opposed to ‘government’, does not stem
from some overarching governmental authority. See also Commission on Global Governance, Our Global
Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1995).
5. This is the central argument of T. Cottier and M. Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’,
(2003) 7MaxPlanck Yearbook of UnitedNations Law 261–328. See in this sense also the recent Resolution of the
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2. SOME WORKING DEFINITIONS: ‘CONSTITUTION’,
‘CONSTITUTIONALIZATION’, AND ‘CONSTITUTIONALISM’
In order to identify a constitutionwithin international law and to discern elements
of global constitutionalism, we must first clarify the notions of ‘constitution’, ‘con-
stitutional law’, ‘constitutionalization’, andfinally ‘constitutionalism’. This is all the
more important since all these terms have manymeanings, are employed by differ-
ent authors in very different senses, and consequently contribute to confusions in
the current debates.
‘Constitution’ is anambiguous concept,6 whosevarious (contested) elementswill
be explored below (section 3). At the outset, it is important to note that this paper
deals with ‘constitution’ in a normative sense only.We are not concerned here with
‘constitution’ as adescriptive term, in the senseof ‘Amsterdamis constitutedby little
canals’. We may take it as a positive omen that the first modern and still accepted
definition of constitution (in a normative sense) was given not in a treatise on do-
mestic law, but by an international lawyer in a book on the law of nations. Writing
in 1758, Emer de Vattel explained that ‘le re`glement fondamental qui de´termine la
manie`re dont l’Autorite´ Publique doit eˆtre exerce´e est ce qui forme la Constitution
de l’Etat’.7 Relying on this (rather broad) definition, this paper assumes that a consti-
tution (in a normative sense) is the sum of basic (materially most important) legal
normswhich comprehensively regulate the social and political life of a polity. ‘Con-
stitutional law’ is not quite synonymous, because this term is somewhat less than
the term ‘constitution’ associatedwith awritten document.8 The term ‘constitution’
has a positive appeal which is owed to the positive connotations of a legitimate
constitution as a good order (although theremay also be illegitimate constitutions).
Constitutionshavehistorically been closely linked to states. Someobservers even
contrasted the constitutional idea with the (ostensibly anti-constitutional) interna-
tional sphere.9 However, the term ‘constitution’ was never exclusively reserved for
state constitutions. Today, the notional link between constitution and state has fur-
ther been loosened in everyday language and in the legal discourse (and thereby
the meaning of ‘constitution’ may have been broadened). It is therefore not per
definitionem impossible to conceptualize constitutional lawbeyond thenationor the
state.
UN General Assembly on the 2005World Summit Outcome, recognizing ‘the need for universal adherence
to and implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international level ’. UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 of
24 Oct. 2005, para. 134 (emphasis added).
6. See for excellent historical and lexical accounts in different national traditions: H. Mohnhaupt and
D. Grimm, Verfassung. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (1995); U. K. Preuss, ‘Verfas-
sung’, in J. Ritter (ed.),HistorischesWo¨rterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 11 (2001), at 635–43;O. Beaud, ‘Constitution
et constitutionnalisme’, in P. Raynaud and S. Rials (eds.),Dictionnaire de philosophie politique (2003), at 133–42.
See also A. Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (2001), at 38–92.
7. E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle applique´s a` la conduite et aux affaires de Nations et des
Souverains (1758, repr. 1916), book I, chap. III, § 27 (at 31).
8. See D. Fellmann, ‘Constitutional Law’, in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 5 (1980), 84 et seq.
9. ‘E´tat ou barbarie, telle est l’alternative simple que connaıˆt la socie´te´ internationale.’ S. Sur, ‘L’e´tat entre
e´clatement et mondialisation’, (1997) 30 Revue belge de droit international 5, at 11.
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Based on the preceding preliminary reflections, we may formulate as a working
hypothesis that ‘global (or international) constitutional law’ is the bulk of the most
important norms which regulate political activity and relationships in the global
polity (consisting of states and other subjects of international law). It is a subset
of international rules and principles which are so important that they deserve
the label ‘constitution’. Whether these norms (rules and principles) of potential
constitutional quality are superior to ordinary international norms, whether they
are codified in one or several documents, whether they are created by states or
by other actors as well, whether they are always ‘hard’ legal norms, whether they
embody a specific set of material principles, and whether they are ‘constitutional’
only to the extent that they are enforceable by some formof judicial review, remains
to be seen.
‘Constitutionalization’ is shorthand for the emergence of constitutional lawwithin
a given legal order. The concept of constitutionalization implies that a constitution
(or constitutional law) can come into being in a process extended through time.
It also implies that a legal text (or various legal texts) can acquire (or eventually
lose) constitutional properties in a positive feedback process. A text can therefore
bemore (or less) constitution-like. It may be, in short, a constitution-in-the-making.
In consequence, ‘global (or international) constitutionalization’ is used in this paper as a
catchword for the continuing process of the emergence, creation, and identification
of constitution-like elements in the international legal order.10
Another important term inour context is ‘constitutionalism’.11 Historically, ‘consti-
tutionalism’, was the politicalmovement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centur-
ies in quest of a written constitution (of the nation state). The basic purpose of the
constitution was to subdue political power (the prince) to the law, hence to create a
government of laws, not ofmen. Inorder to reach that objective the constitutionwas
to embody certain material principles, most importantly the separation of powers,
or checks and balances. It is important to realize that the concept of ‘constitutional-
ism’ is more than the term ‘constitution’ (which is in that respect more ambiguous)
loadedwithmaterial contents. ‘Constitutionalism does not refer simply to having a
constitution, but tohavingaparticularkindof constitution,howeverdifficult itmay
be to specify its contents.’12 Until today, ‘constitutionalism’ has – as a prescriptive
10. Beyond the purely domestic context, the term ‘constitutionalization’ was coined with regard to the EC/EU.
See, seminally, ‘The Constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome’, G. Casper, ‘Remarks’, in American Society
of International Law (ed.), Proceedings of the 72–d Annual Meeting (1978) 169, at 173.
11. See G. Casper, ‘Constitutionalism’, in L. W. Levy, K. L. Karst, and D. J. Mahoney (eds.), Encyclopedia of the
American Constitution, Vol. 2 (1986), at 473–80; U. K. Preuss, ‘Constitutionalism’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2 (1998), 618 et seq.; Red., ‘Konstitutionalismus’, in J. Ritter (ed.), Historisches
Wo¨rterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 4 (1989), at 1005; Beaud, supra note 6, at 133 et seq.
12. Casper, supra note 11, at 474. J. H. Weiler and M. Wind have correctly pointed out that ‘there is a difference
between constitution and constitutionalism. Constitutionalism . . . embodies the values, often non-stated,
which underlie the material and institutional provisions in a specific constitution. At this level, separating
constitution from constitutionalism would allow us to claim, rightly or wrongly, for example, that the
Italian andGerman constitutions,whilst very different in theirmaterial and institutional provisions, share a
similar constitutionalism vindicating certain neo-Kantian humanistic values, combined with the notion of
theRechtsstaat’ (J. H.Weiler andM.Wind, ‘Introduction’, in J. H.Weiler andM.Wind (eds.), European Constitu-
tionalism Beyond the State (2003) 1, at 3). See extensively on the ‘divorce’ of constitution and constitutionalism
Beaud, supra note 6, at 136–42.
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term – basically retained the meaning sketched out above. It is associated with rule
of law and with containment, sometimes even with judicial review and eventually
with constitutional courts.13
Jed Rubenfeld has argued that two diverging conceptions of constitutionalism,
namely a genuinely ‘European’ one andadifferent ‘American’ one, exist. In that view,
‘international constitutionalism’ is a genuinely European conception. In contrast,
the(supposedly)American ‘democraticnationalconstitutionalism’regardsconstitu-
tional law ‘as the embodiment of aparticular nation’s democratically self-given legal
and political commitments’.14 However, the ostensibly genuinely ‘American’ claim
that international constitutional law is irreconcilable with domestic democratic
mechanisms and popular sovereignty has been intensely and painfully discussed
in Europe with a view to the EU constitution, notably by German jurists.15 So the
controversy around this tension is not a debate between national-constitutional
cultures, but a cross-cutting one between diverging, but transnational, ideologies.
Moreover, I canfindno logical or constructive reasonswhyUS constitutional theory
cannot – unlike European constitutionalism – accept the idea of containment by
international law. If the asserted specifically American outlook on constitutional-
ism does indeed exist (which is, as just pointed out, doubtful), it is simply due to the
bad habits of a government which is powerful enough to have its way. So we can
safely rely on the (more abstract) core of both the ‘European’ conception of constitu-
tionalism (Britain and France being themother countries of constitutionalism) and
the ‘American’ conception. This is the idea that some (superior16) law exists which
confines government.17 Constitutionalism implies, in short, government (and also
governance) under law.
Building on this transnational consensus, I employ the term ‘global (or inter-
national) constitutionalism’ in order to characterize a strand of thought (an outlook or
perspective) and a political agendawhich advocate the application of constitutional
principles, such as the rule of law, checks and balances, human rights protection,
and democracy, in the international legal sphere in order to improve the effectivity
and the fairness of the international legal order.18 Global constitutionalism is, in
13. See B. Ackerman, ‘The Rise ofWorld Constitutionalism’, (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 771–97.
14. J. Rubenfeld, ‘The Two World Orders’, (2003) 27 Wilson Quarterly 28 et seq. See also the contributions in
G. Nolte (ed.),American and European Constitutionalism (2005).
15. See, seminally, D. Grimm, ‘Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?’, (1995) 50 Juristen-Zeitung 581 et seq.
16. A higher rank is not incumbent on the British Constitution; see section 3.1.
17. See for the US view J. Madison, ‘No. 51’, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (1961 [1788]), at 322:
‘In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed and in the next place, oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control of government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.’ See for a German view the classic work by W. von
Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen derWirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen (1792). See for French
constitutionalism Beaud, supra note 6, at 136.
18. Cf. B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’, (1998) 36
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, at 552: ‘the concept [of constitutionalism] is meant to describe or
promote a legal integration of stateswhich ismore intense than the traditional one . . . . International consti-
tutionalism is a progressive movement which aims at fostering international cooperation by consolidating
the substantive legal ties between states as well as the organizational structures built in the past.’
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the words of Richard Falk, ‘[t]he extension of constitutionalist thinking to world
order’.19
After these terminological clarifications, we shall proceed first to identify formal
andmaterial elements and functions of domestic constitutional law (section 3), and
then describe and relate international and transnational ‘constitutionalization’ to
these elements (sections 4 to 6).
3. A CLOSER LOOK AT STATE CONSTITUTIONS
3.1. Formal elements of state constitutions
State constitutions are normally said to have typical formal characteristics. One is
that they are codified in one document. ‘La constitution, a` l’origine, est d’abord un
acte e´crit.’20 Writtenness is an essential element of the modern, North American
and continental notion of constitution. The quest for a constitutional charter was
the primordial objective of the constitutionalistmovement in theUnited States, last
but not least in reaction to the British Constitution, which the American colonists
deemed arbitrary andunjust. The BritishConstitution consisted and still consists, as
iswellknown,ofvariouscharters,bills, judicialpronouncements, andconstitutional
conventions. It is therefore in part an ‘unwritten’ constitution.
The second traditional formal property of constitutional law is that it supersedes
ordinary law. The technical device to secure the constitution’s superiority is a spe-
cial amendingprocedurewhich shields the constitution frommodification through
ordinary legislation. Again, the British Constitution is an exception, because the
English parliament has, by virtue of parliamentary sovereignty, the power to make
and amend laws of a constitutional quality in the ordinary legislative procedure.
TheBritishConstitution is therefore a ‘flexible’ as opposed to a ‘rigid’ constitution in
terms of the distinction established by James Bryce.21 The Constitution of the Ger-
manEmpire (1871–1918)wasalso a ‘flexible’ constitutionwithout special sanctity.22
The third formal featureof codifiedconstitutions is that theyaremadebyapouvoir
constituant in a kind of constitutional big bang. Themost influential theorists of the
19. R. Falk, ‘The Pathways of Global Constitutionalism’, in R. Falk et al. (eds.), The Constitutional Foundations of
WorldPeace (1993)13,at14. ‘Thisoutlookisbasedonbothwill (ordesire)andinterest (ornecessity) [toachieve]
a more institutionalized (although not necessarily more centralized) form of governance that avoids war in conflict
situations andworks towards aworld inwhich thewell-being of all is safeguarded by enforceable rights, and
the environment is protected on behalf of future generations as well as those now alive . . . . “Global consti-
tutionalism” as used here, is itself a manifestation of global civil society in a nascent form’ (ibid., emphasis
added).SeealsoJ.H. Jackson, ‘ChangingFundamentalsof InternationalLawandInternationalEconomicLaw’,
(2003) 41Archiv des Vo¨lkerrechts 435, at 447: ‘We are going to need a new constitutionalism of institutions.’
20. D. Rousseau, ‘Une re´surrection: La notion de Constitution’, (1990) 106 Revue du droit public et de la science
politique en France et l’e´tranger 5.
21. Flexible constitutions ‘proceed from the same authorities which make the ordinary laws; and they are
promulgated or repealed in the same way as ordinary laws.’ In a polity with a flexible constitution, ‘all
laws (excluding of course by-laws, municipal regulations, and so forth) are of the same rank and exert the
same force. There is, moreover, only one legislative authority competent to pass laws in all cases and for
all purposes.’ In contrast, ‘the distinctive mark of these Rigid Constitutions is their superiority to ordinary
statutes. They are not the work of the ordinary legislature, and therefore cannot be changed by it.’ (J. Bryce,
‘Essay III: Flexible and Rigid Constitutions’, in J. Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. I (1901, repr.
1980), at 150–1 and 217–18).
22. G. Meyer and G. Anschu¨tz, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts (1914–19), at 743–4.
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pouvoir constituant, theFrenchrevolutionistAbbe´ Sieye`s23 and theGerman juristCarl
Schmitt,24 formulated their conceptions with a view to the political revolutions of
their time, which brought into being new constitutions abruptly, and accompanied
by upheaval, chaos, and violence (1789 in France, 1918 inGermany). Again, we have
the exception of England, whose constitutional law continuously evolved through
centuries. And of course it is widely acknowledged that constitutions are living
instruments25 which are more or less silently modified and transformed through
judicial and political practice.26
3.2. Traditional functions and substantial properties of state constitutions
The substantial components of a ‘constitution’ are evenmore contested. There are at
least three answers to the following question: Which functions and contents must
be present to call a given body of law a ‘constitution’ (or at least ‘constitutional
law’)? The broadest notion of constitution refers to the bulk of laws organizing and
institutionalizingapolity. International law is currently ina stateof someorganization
and institutionalization. Therefore we have an international constitution in this
broadest sense.
The narrower, functional notion of constitution relates to rules and principles
fulfilling typical constitutional functions. The traditional constitutional functions are to
constitute a political entity as a legal entity, to organize it, to limit political power, to
offer political andmoral guidelines, to justify governance, and, finally, to contribute
to integration.27
The third and narrowest notion, which I should like to call a legitimist notion
of a constitution, is the one underlying eighteenth- and nineteenth-century con-
stitutionalism. It has been enunciated most famously in Article 16 of the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 26 August 1789: ‘Toute societe´
dans laquelle la garantie des droits n’est pas assure´e, ni la se´paration des pouvoirs
de´termine´e, n’a point de constitution.’ Human rights and the separation of powers
are the necessary elements of a constitution. Nowadays, further material elements
have been added, most importantly democracy and a minimum of social security
guarantees. From this perspective, ‘constitution’ is a value-laden concept.
4. DIFFERENT PHENOMENA OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Against the background of what has usually (on the domestic plane) been called
a ‘constitution’ in the functional or the legitimist sense just explained, we shall
23. A. Sieye`s,Qu’est-ce qu’est le tiers e´tat? (1789).
24. C. Schmitt,Verfassungslehre (1928), at 75–6.
25. Aconstitutional act calls ‘into life abeing thedevelopmentofwhichcouldnothavebeen foreseencompletely
by themost gifted of its begetters.’ Justice O.Wendell Holmes, inMissouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1919).
26. Themost important German theorists holding this view are R. Smend, ‘Verfassung undVerfassungsrecht’, in
R. Smend, Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen (1994), at 192–3 (orig. 1928); P. Ha¨berle, ‘Verfassungsinterpretation
und Verfassunggebung’, in P. Ha¨berle, Verfassung als o¨ffentlicher Prozeß: Materialien zu einer Verfassungstheorie
der offenenGesellschaft (1978) 182–224; andF.Mu¨ller,Fragment (u¨ber) verfassunggebendeGewalt desVolkes (1995,
manuscript of 1967/68), at 15, 22, 34.
27. See extensively Peters, supra note 6, at 76 et seq.
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in the next step approach the subject from the opposite side and look at those
phenomena discussed under the heading of ‘constitutionalization of international
law’. We should then be able to judge to what extent this heading is justified.
4.1. New bases of legitimacy of international law
The basic premise of the constitutionalist school is that the international com-
munity is a legal community.28 A legal community is governed by rules and prin-
ciples, not (only) by power. The most fundamental norms might represent global
constitutional law. Starting from this point, constitutionalists discern and support
the emergence of new bases of legitimacy for the international legal system; the
traditional legitimating factors of international governance are state sovereignty
and the effective exercise of power. Therefore, international law used to be blind
to constitutional principles within states. In contrast, the idea of constitutionalism
implies that state sovereignty is gradually being complemented (not substituted) by
other guiding principles, notably the respect for human rights,29 human dignity,30
‘human security’,31 a ‘principle of civil inviolability’,32 and/or the ‘global common
interest’ and/or ‘rule of law’. Because state sovereignty remains important as a shield
against intervention by great powers, it does not further the cause of constitution-
alism to strive for the establishment of a new ‘foundational norm’ which would
replace sovereignty.33 However, the concept of state sovereignty is undergoing im-
portant modifications,34 and respect for sovereignty is being linked to respect for
human rights.35 How these links should be guaranteed in practice (in particular
whether in extreme cases by military means ‘humanitarian intervention’) requires
further exploration. Despite these open and hard questions, it can hardly be denied
that the international legal order is in the process of shifting from an order based on
‘Westphalian sovereignty’36 (conceived as carte blanche for national governments
28. See for references to the ‘international community as a whole’, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited (second phase), [1970] ICJ Rep. 3, para. 33; ICC Statute of 17 July 1998 (UNTS
Vol. 2187, No. 38544), Preamble, para. 4, and ILC Articles on state responsibility (2001), Doc. A/CN.4/L.602,
Rev. 1, Art. 42(b). See in scholarship A. Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Vo¨lkerrecht (2001), Eng.
summary at 439 et seq.
29. See,e.g.,Habermas,supranote2,at123,relyingonI.Kant;B.-O.Bryde, ‘KonstitutionalisierungdesVo¨lkerrechts
und Internationalisierung des Verfassungsrechts’, (2003) 42 Der Staat 61, at 64–6; A. Buchanan, Justice,
Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (2004) passim, e.g. at 290.
30. E.g. D. Thu¨rer, ‘Von der komplexen Gestalt des Vo¨lkerrechts,’ in J. Bro¨hmer et al. (eds.), Internationale
Gemeinschaft undMenschenrechte (2005), 307, at 312.
31. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect
(2001), 14–18, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (last visited
28 Aug. 2005).
32. A.-M. Slaughter and W. Burke-White, ‘An International Constitutional Moment’, (2002) 43 Harvard Inter-
national Law Journal 1, esp. at 2–3 (suggesting that besides the prohibition of the use of force between states
is established a provision prohibiting the use of force by civilians against civilians as ‘parallel prohibitions
that are the twin foundations of international order’).
33. B. Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, (1998) 9 EJIL 599–625; J. L. Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire
versus International Law’, (2004) 128 Ethics & International Affairs 1–24.
34. S.D.Krasner,Sovereignty:OrganizedHypocrisy (1999);N. Schrijver, ‘TheChangingNatureofStateSovereignty’,
(1999) 70 BYIL 65–98.
35. See ICISS, supra note 31; J. P. Mu¨ller, ‘Wandel des Souvera¨nita¨tsbegriffs im Lichte der Grundrechte’, in
R. Rhinow, S. Breitenmoser, and B. Ehrenzeller (eds.), Fragen des internationalen und nationalenMenschenrechts-
schutzes (1997), 45, at 61–6.
36. Krasner, supra note 34.
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to organize their domestic legal and political structures without any authoritative
external interference) to a ‘hybrid’ or ‘dualistic’ world order, based on (modified)
state sovereignty and the autonomy or self-determination of the individual.37 The
principle of state sovereignty no longer serves as the exclusive source of legitimacy
of international norms (and is, from a normative standpoint, increasingly contested
as a legitimizing factor in itself).
4.2. International lawmaking: the erosion of the consent requirement
The current shift of the justificatory basis of international law manifests itself in
a number of legal developments on the international plane. The first cross-cutting
phenomenon is the erosion of the consent requirement.38 In customary law, the
weakening of the persistent-objector rule is the relevant legal trend.39 In the law of
international institutions, the practice ofmajority voting in organs of international
organizations and treaty bodies (and the ensuing obligation of ‘defeated’ states to
complywith these decisions) points in this direction aswell. These areas of lawwill
be left aside here. In the following, I shall focus on the law of treaties only.
Certain types of international legal acts and their outcomes (be it objective re-
gimes, world-order treaties, or legislation by the Security Council) have ‘third-party
effects’.40 Already Hans Kelsen has observed that
The restriction of the personal sphere of validity of contractual norms establishing
obligations . . . is the consequence of the principle of the sovereignty of the state,
which – as it is usually understood – implies that a state cannot be legally bound
without its consent. It is, however, a characteristic tendency of modern international
law to restrict this principle. Treaties imposing obligations upon third states have been
generally recognized in a steadily increasingmeasure.41
For example, Article 2(6) of the UN Charter foresees that the United Nations ‘shall
ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance
with theseprinciples so far asmaybenecessary for themaintenanceof international
peace and security’. Moreover, it is often assumed that international treaties on
territories may create ‘objective regimes’.42 Such ‘status treaties’ have secured the
37. Cf. Art. I-1 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 29 October 2004, which begins with the
formula: ‘Reflecting thewill of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution
establishes the European Union, . . .’ (OJ 2004 C 310/1). See in scholarship on the dual foundation of the
global legal order Habermas, supra note 2, at 133; Cohen, supra note 33, at 13. Arguably, this dual foundation
is still lopsided in the sense that the state sovereignty pillar is the load-bearing one.
38. C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will’, (1993) 241-IV Recueil des cours
209–40.
39. J. Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law’, (1986) 56
BYIL 1–24.
40. See comprehensively for the law of treaties with numerous examples G. Dahm, J. Delbru¨ck and R.Wolfrum,
Vo¨lkerrecht, Vol. I/3 (2002), at 613–32 (§ 152 on ‘Vertra¨ge zugunsten und zu Lasten Dritter; insbesondere
Vertra¨ge mit erga omnes Wirkung’). But see critically M. A. Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Parties and the Law of
Treaties’, (2002) 6MaxPlanckYearbook ofUnitedNations Law 37–137, concluding that the principle pacta tertiis
nec nocent nec prosunt remains the general rule and that rights and obligations of third states stemming from
treaties to which they are not parties remain exceptional.
41. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, rev. and ed. R.W. Tucker (1966), 487.
42. See Art. 63 (‘Treaties providing for objective re´gimes’) of the International Law Commission (ILC) draft for
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1964 by special rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock: ‘A
treaty establishes an objective re´gime when . . . the intention of the parties is to create in the general interest
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demilitarization of the Aaland Islands43 or a free passage through the Kiel Canal.44
Further examples are the League of Nations’ Mandate on Namibia,45 the Antarctic
Treaty46 and theDeep Sea regime.47 These contractual regimes oblige and empower
thirdparties to the limitedextent that theymust tolerate the regimeandmayrequest
its implementation.48
A closely related institution are world-order treaties, formerly called traite´s-lois.
Such treaties have been adopted in the subject areas of human rights, law of the
sea, environmental law, world trade law and international criminal law. A charac-
teristic feature of these world-order treaties is their quasi-universal membership.
A more contested characteristic is their arguably non-reciprocal structure, which
means that they embody collective obligations serving global community interests
which transcend the individual interests of the state parties.49 In the words of the
InternationalCourtof Justice (ICJ)with regard to thegenocideconvention: ‘In sucha
convention, the contracting states donothave any interest of their own; theymerely
have, one and all, a common interest.’50 Even more contested is the potential of those
world-order treaties to bind non-parties to the treaties’ basic rules without making
the third states formally aparty to the treaty. Suchaneffect is, for example, attributed
general obligations and rights relating to a particular region, State, territory, locality, river, waterway, or to a
particular area of the sea, sea-bed, or air-space . . .’ (Third Report on the Law of Treaties, (1964) II Yearbook of
the International LawCommission 26, emphasis added). The construction of an objective regime has, however,
not without grounds, been criticized as reflecting imperialist tendencies.
43. According to the International Commission of Jurists of the League of Nations, the Treaty of Paris of
30 March 1856, which demilitarized the islands with effect for the state of Finland (which came into
being only later), had created a ‘ve´ritable droit objectif, de vrais statuts politiques, dont les effets se font
sentir en dehors meˆme du cercle de parties contractantes’ (Rapport de la Commission Internationale de
Juristes Charge´e par le Conseil de la Socie´te´ des Nations de donner un avis consultatif sur les aspects
juridiques de la Question des Iles d’Aaland, Socie´te´ des Nations, J.O. Suppl. Spe´c. No. 3 (October 1920) 3,
at 17).
44. Art. 380of theTreatyofVersailles of 28 June1919opened theCanal tovessels of all nations (‘toutes lesnations
en paix avec l’Allemagne’) (Martens N.R.G. 3ie`me Se´r., Vol. 11, 321 et seq.). This provision internationalized
the until then purely national waterway ‘for the benefit of all nations of the world’ (Wimbledon, (1923), PCIJ
Ser. A, No. 1, at 22).
45. The contractually agreed mandate was not terminated by the dissolution of the League of Nations (Inter-
national Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, [1950] ICJ Rep. 128, 132–6). See also Judge Sir Arnold
McNair: ‘From time to time it happens that a group of Great Powers, or a large number of States both great
and small, assume a power to create by amultipartite treaty some new international re´gime or status which
soon acquires a degree of acceptance and durability extending beyond the limits of the actual contracting parties,
and giving it an objective existence. This power is used when some public interest is involved, and its existence
often occurs in the course of a peace settlement at the end of a great war’ (McNair, Separate Opinion, ibid.,
146, at 153 (emphasis added)).
46. Art. X of the Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959 (UNTS Vol. 71, 402) may be interpreted as imposing on
third parties an obligation to intervene (see critically B. Simma, ‘The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing
for an “Objective Regime”, (1986) 19 Cornell International Law Journal 189–209).
47. See UNCLOS of 10 December 1982, UNTSVol. 1833, 3, Art. 137. See on the third-party effect of this provision
R.Wolfrum,Die Internationalisierung staatsfreier Ra¨ume (1984), at 395–6.
48. E. Klein, Statusvertra¨ge im Vo¨lkerrecht (1980), on the third-party effects at 345–8.
49. See, seminally, B. Simma, ‘FromBilateralism toCommunity Interests’, (1994) 250-VIRecueil des cours217–384.
The emergence of community interests is one of the core propositions of the Spanish ‘objectivist school’ of
international law; see, e.g., J. D. Gonza´lez Campos, L. I. Sa´nchez Rodrı´guez, and P. A. Sa´enz de Santa Marı´a,
Curso de derecho internacional pu´blico (2002), 68. See with regard to the human rights instruments Human
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 (1994), paras. 8 and 17 (CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.6). Negating the
‘collective’ character of the WTO-Agreement: J. Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations:
AreWTOObligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 EJIL 907–51.
50. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951] ICJ Rep., at 23
(emphasis added).
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by (so-far minority voices) to the Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995.51 Finally, the new
regimes are increasingly enforced by international courts and tribunals, such as the
International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS), oron the regional levelby theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights (ECHR).
This is noteworthy, because judicial review is one of the core elements of the rule of
law.
A final manifestation of the erosion of the consent requirement is ‘legislation’
by the Security Council.52 After 1989 the Security Council has occasionally issued
‘generic resolutions’,53 which may – due to their general and abstract character –
aptly be qualified as ‘laws’. These laws are binding via Article 25 of the UN Charter
and circumvent eventual ratification requirements of parallel treaties. Overall, the
renouncement of consent means to recast sovereignty by transforming it into the
right and power to participate in, but not to veto, international decision-making.
From this perspective, constitutionalism supplants voluntarism.
4.3. Global community interests
Core provisions of the world-order treaties, as already mentioned, but also some
customary law principles have been called ‘public interest norms’.54 In fact, the
emergence of these norms is sometimes, notably in continental scholarship, con-
sidered to be the main element of global constitutionalism: ‘Constitutionalization
of public international law means recognition of interests of the community of
states and the introduction of mechanisms for their implementation.’55 These
global common interests relate to global goods and/or reflect common assump-
tions and shared attitudes. At least in part, the relevant norms embody universal
values. Examples of global community interests are the interest in protecting
human beings and the common heritage of mankind, or in realizing sustain-
able development globally. More contested is the interest in realizing global free
trade.
4.4. Statehood and recognition
We witness changes in the concept of statehood and a legal evolution regard-
ing the recognition of states and governments.56 In this context, the principle of
51. See notably the Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 33(2): ‘States Parties shall take measures consistent with this
Agreement and international law to deter the activities of vessels flying the flag of non-partieswhich under-
mine the effective implementation of this Agreement’ (Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation andManagement
of Straddling Stocks andHighlyMigratory Fish Stocks of 8 September 1995, (1995) 34 ILM 1542 et seq., emphasis
added). See on the third-party effect J. Ziemer, Das gemeinsame Interesse an einer Regelung der Hochseefischerei
(2000), 187 et seq.
52. See S. Talmon, ‘The Security Council asWorld Legislature’, (2005) 99 AJIL 175–93.
53. Notably UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), installing the ICTY; UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) on the financing of
terrorism; UNDoc. S/RES/1540 (2004) on weapons of mass destruction in the hand of private actors.
54. J. Delbru¨ck (ed.),New Trends in International Lawmaking – International ‘Legislation’ in the Public Interest (1997).
55. J. A. Frowein, ‘Konstitutionalisierung des Vo¨lkerrechts’, (2000) 39 Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft fu¨r
Vo¨lkerrecht 427, at 447.
56. Under thedeclarative theoryof recognition, theact of grantingorwithholding recognitiondoesnot in theory
affect statehood (the international legal personality). However, the idea of an ‘objective’ legal personality of a
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effectiveness ismarginalized, and standardsof legitimacy (concerninghumanrights
and democracy) are set up.57 For instance, the UN organs declared as ‘null and void’
the South African Constitution of 1984 which entrenched the apartheid system,
because it was contrary to the principles of the UN Charter.58
After the break-up of the SovietUnion andYugoslavia, the EuropeanCommunity
(EC) set up guidelines for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union inwhich the new stateswere required – inter alia – to subscribe
to the commitments ‘in the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris, especially
with regard to the rule of law, democracy andhuman rights’.59 The EC then installed
anArbitralCommissionwhichdeterminedbymeansofaquasi-judicialexamination
whether the requirements for recognition were satisfied.
Another example is the treatment of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. In
1996, theTalibansoughtinternationalrecognitionandarepresentationattheUnited
Nations. However, the new government was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and theUnitedArabEmirates, andwasnot allowed to send its representative
to the United Nations. Refusal of recognition was explained by reference to the
Taliban government’s violations of human rights, notably of women’s rights.60
East Timor’s process towards independence was closely monitored by the UN.
The new state’s constitution of 22 March 2002 was signed in the presence of
the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Transitional Administrator, and
the relevant UN reports emphasized that the Constitution provided ‘for a unitary
democratic state, based on the rule of law and the principle of the separation of
powers’.61
Finally, after the Iraqwar, a Security Council Resolution formulated, albeit impli-
citly, conditions for the recognition of a new Iraqi government. The Council here
encouraged the people of Iraq to form ‘a representative government based on the
rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to
ethnicity, religion, or gender’.62
Although democratic legitimism in international recognitionhad beenpractised
earlier, notably by the United States and the United Kingdom in the nineteenth
century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, this practice was – before
state based on ‘objective’ facts even in the absence of any recognition is somewhat artificial. The artificiality
of the construction was highlighted by the post-1989 recognition practice which pro-actively consolidated
weak political entities which did not fulfil or only to a limited degree fulfilled the ordinary criteria of
statehood.
57. Most recently J. d’Aspremont, ‘La cre´ation internationale d’Etats de´mocratiques’, (2005) 109RevueGe´ne´rale de
Droit International Public 889, concluding that ‘nowadays, international administrations of territories entail
thecreationofdemocraticinstitutions . . . . it isbeyonddoubtthatwhilsttheinternationalcommunitycannot
entirely control the birth of States, it strives to . . . impose a precise type of political regime’ (quotation from
Englishabstract). SeealsoB.A.Roth,Governmental Illegitimacy in InternationalLaw (1999);R.Rich, ‘Recognition
of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’, (1993) 4 EJIL 36–65; Frowein, supra note 55, at
429–32; J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2006).
58. UN Doc. S/RES/554 (1984), paras. 1–2 and UNDoc. A/39/2 (1984), para. 1.
59. Guidelines of 16 December 1991, repr. in (1992) 31 ILM 1486 et seq.
60. See in the press, e.g., M. Spillmann, ‘Kein Ende des Blutvergiessens in Afghanistan’, Neue Zu¨richer Zeitung,
27 Aug. 1999.
61. Report of the Secretary-General on theUnitedNations Transitional Administration in East Timor of 17April
2002, para. 5 (UNDoc. S/2002/432); see also UNDoc./S/RES/1480 (2003), para. 2 of the Preamble.
62. UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
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1989 – too selective to become customary law. After 1989 the density of preced-
ents may work towards the emergence of a legal principle embracing substantial
conditions for international recognition beyond the effectiveness test.
4.5. The intertwinement and complementarity of international
(constitutional) law and national (constitutional) law
The emergence of an additional, more ‘individualist’ basis for the legitimacy of
international law implies that international law does care about domestic constitu-
tional standards. States areno longer a blackbox for international law, because inter-
national organizations, treaty bodies, foreign states, officials of foreign state organs,
and transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) scrutinize and assess
national constitutional systems, and impose material standards of governance re-
lating, inter alia, to the protection of human rights and democracy. This also means
that both spheres (the international and the national) can no longer be neatly sep-
arated. They already complement each other and should do so even more in the
future.
Dense international legal obligations require states to enact specific domestic
legislation, even on the level of constitutional law. For instance, the Swiss con-
stitution (Bundesverfassung, BV) of 18 April 1999 incorporates in Article 25(2) the
non-refoulement principle, and seeks to fulfil the duty to protect children imposed
on member states by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 2(3)) by in-
troducing a novel constitutional article on the protection of children.63 However,
the thicker the web of international legal obligations becomes, the more resistance
meets the classical claim of supremacy of all international law over all domestic
law. States rather insist upon at least safeguarding core constitutional principles
against international encroachment. In this situation the relationship between in-
ternational andnational law cannot plausibly be described as a clear hierarchy. Both
bodies of norms rather form a network.64
One exemplary field of intertwinement of international and national constitu-
tional principles is the field of democratic law and governance.65 The globalization
of economic, political, military, and legal problems, relationships, and power struc-
tures has led to three democratic deficiencies within nation states. A first deficiency
stems from the fact that – because of global interdependencies – state activities
have become further reaching and more extraterritorial. This means that political
decisions (e.g. on tax reduction, raising environmental standards, building nuclear
plants)affectpeople inother states,peoplewhohavenotelected thedecision-makers
and can in noway control them. A second aspect is that the transnational character
of issues, and the mobility and interaction of individuals, firms, and NGOs (des-
pite the increasing extraterritorial effects of regulation), have on thewhole reduced
63. Art. 11 BV.
64. See also infra, section 6.5.
65. See for the international imposition of standards of democracy to states infra section 6.4. See on the ef-
fects of globalization on domestic democracy A. von Bogdandy, ‘Demokratie, Globalisierung, Zukunft des
Vo¨lkerrechts – eine Bestandsaufnahme’, (2003) 63 Zeitschrift fu¨r ausla¨ndisches o¨ffentliches Recht und Vo¨lkerrecht
853–77.
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the power of the nation state to tackle and solve problems by itself. In terms of
democracy, this general loss of effectiveness reduces in turn the effectiveness of
self-determination, or democratic output. So here we face a kind of indirect decline
of democracy.66 The third deficiency lies in the lack of any democratic mandate for
or control of non-state decision-makers. In order to regain control, states have to
co-operate within international organizations, through bilateral and multilateral
treaties and so forth. But these conventional methods of global governance aggrav-
ate the democratic deficit, because the link between voters and decision-makers is
loosened. Non-state law making is in all international institutions law making by
representatives of the states’ executive branches, not by parliaments. Moreover, the
complexity of the process blurs the lines of responsibility between the actors in
international regimes, and further threatens the functioning of the institutions of
control and call-back. The conclusion to draw from all this is that if we want to
preserve aminimum level of democratic governance, thenwe have tomove beyond
the state and establish compensatory, transnational democratic structures.67
4.6. Global public–private constitutionalism
Afinal phenomenonwhich can be analysed from a constitutional perspective is the
growingparticipationofnon-state actors, suchasNGOs, transnational corporations,
and individuals in international law making and law enforcement. Public opinion
and the involvement of actors from civil society and the private sector have been
acknowledged by the United Nations itself to be key factors of effective action on
global priorities.68
In recent years NGO lobbying has strongly influenced international standard-
setting. Notably, the Landmines Convention of 199769 and the ICC Statute of 1998
would probably not have come into being without the intense work of transna-
tional NGO coalitions. Conversely, NGO resistance was a crucial contribution to
the failure of the projected Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998.
On the implementation level, it is well known that the efficiency of human rights
monitoring to a large extent depends on shadow reports of NGOs submitted to the
respective treaty bodies.70 World TradeOrganization (WTO) law is also increasingly
enforced by ad hoc public–private trade litigation partnerships formed by private
firms in collaborationwith governments.71 Moreover, international environmental
66. M. J. Sandel,Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Policy (1996), 202.
67. ‘Democracy within a nation-state requires democracy within a network of intersecting international forces
and relations. This is the meaning of democratization today.’ D. Held, ‘Democracy, the Nation-State and
the Global System’, in D. Held, Political Theory Today (1991), 197, at 232. See for concrete proposals We the
Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance: Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United
Nations – Civil Society Relations (June 2004), Doc. A/58/817 (Cardoso Report), available at http://www.un-
ngls.org/UNreform.htm (last visited 1 Sept. 2005), Part VI, ‘Engaging with elected representatives’
(paras. 101–52).
68. Cardoso Report, supra note 67.
69. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction of 18 September 1997, UNTS Vol. 2056, at 211.
70. See also ICC Statute, supra note 28, Arts. 15(2) and 44(4), on information submitted by NGOs and on ‘gratis
personnel’ employed by the ICC.
71. G. Shaffer,Defending Interests: Public–Private Partnerships inWTO Litigation (2003).
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law is implemented by public–private partnerships for sustainable development,72
for instance the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) within the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.73 Finally, the compliance mechanism of the
Aarhus Convention on Environmental Information74 can be triggered by private
persons.75
This trend erodes the public–private split on the international plane.76 It may –
on the one hand – contribute to constitutionalization, because it integrates the
transnational civil society into the fabric of international law and thereby arguably
promotes the constitutional principles of broaddeliberation, transparency, andpub-
lic accountability. However, opening up the circle of law makers and law enforcers
creates new problems of legitimacy of international law. Themultiple actors which
contribute to the generation of hard and (more often) soft transnational norms are
not per se legitimate lawmakers, and their empowermentmay camouflage the tend-
ency of governments to avoid commitment to hard and binding law. Nevertheless,
these new structures have been termed ‘global civil constitutions’.77
5. MICRO-CONSTITUTIONALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
5.1. General
Set somewhat apart from the general debate on constitutionalism, one distinct
subject area has been particularly scrutinized through a constitutionalist prism,
namely the law of international organizations. Various theories have for a long time
qualified the foundational treaties of international organizations as the constitution
72. Thesepartnershipswereofficially recognizedas ‘Type II outcomes’ at the2002WorldSummitonSustainable
Development. See Plan of Implementation, revised version of 23 Sept. 2002 (Doc. A/CONF.199/20), available
athttp://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit_docs/2309_planfinal.htm (visited1 June
2004). In scholarship, C. Streck, ‘TheWorld Summit on SustainableDevelopment: Partnerships asNewTools
in Environmental Governance’, (2002) 13 Yearbook of Environmental Law 3–95.
73. See the World Bank Executive Directors’ decision of 20 July 1999 to establish the PCF, available at
http://carbonfinance.org/pcf/router.cfm?Page=About (visited 27 May 2004). The World Bank’s partnership
with thepublic andprivate sectors is intended tomobilizenewresources for its borrowingmember countries
while addressing global environmental problems through market-based mechanisms. The PCF will invest
contributions made by companies and governments in projects designed to produce emission reductions
consistent with the Kyoto Protocol. Participants in the PCF will receive a pro rata share of the emission
reductions.
74. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters of 25 June 1998, available at http://www.unece.org./env/pp/documents/cep43g.pdf
(last visited 27May 2004).
75. Decision I/7 on review of compliance, part. VI ‘Communications from the Public’, paras. 18–24, available at
www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance.htm (last visited 27May 2004).
76. Note that the term ‘public–private split’ in domestic law is often used to designate the separation of two
distinct branches of law, namely public and private law. Both branches of law are state-made law to a large
extent. A different question is whether private entities are (by the relevant legal framework) authorized to
make law.The traditional anduncontested formsof lawcreatedbyprivateactors are contractswhichbind the
(private) parties. The novel phenomenon (both on the national and on the international plane) is to entrust
private actors with standard-setting. Private actors are thereby allowed to make (or to participate in the
making of) general rules which potentially bind third actors. This is meant by ‘erosion of the public–private
split’ in this paper.
77. G. Teubner, ‘Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie’, (1993) 63
Zeitschrift fu¨r ausla¨ndisches o¨ffentliches Recht und Vo¨lkerrecht 1–28.
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of thatrespectiveorganization.Frenchinstitutionalist thinkingledtotheconclusion
that
Sous ce profil, l’acte institutif d’une Organisation de´termine´e est bien un traite´ inter-
national, fonde´, en tant que tel, sur la volonte´ des contractants et donc soumis, au
moment de sa formation, a` leur volonte´, mais il est par ailleurs destine´ a` devenir
la constitution, c’est-a`-dire l’acte de fondation de l’Organisation, auquel celle-ci se
rattache tout au long de son existence. On pourrait dire, par conse´quent, que l’acte
institutif reveˆt la forme dupacte,mais posse`de la substance de la constitution: ne´ sur la
base d’une convention, il de´passe, avec le temps, son origine formelle, jusqu’a` devenir
une constitution de dure´e inde´termine´e dont le de´veloppement de´borde le cadre a`
l’inte´rieur duquel elle avait e´te´ initialement conc¸ue.78
The ICJ found that
From a formal standpoint, the constituent instruments of International Organizations
are multilateral treaties . . . . Such treaties can raise specific problems of interpreta-
tion owing, inter alia, to their character which is conventional and at the same time
institutional.79
We may call this analysis a ‘micro-constitutional analysis’.80 In this particular
context, constitutionalism is a competing paradigm to functionalism. Functionalist
integration strategies have concentrated on forms of (ostensibly) apolitical and
technical international co-operation in order to reach the objective of (ultimately
political) integration more readily. Notably, David Mitrany had already during the
Second World War advocated an international integration strategy ‘which would
rather overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities
and agencies, inwhich and throughwhich the interests and life of all nationswould
be gradually integrated’. ‘[E]conomic unificationwould build up the foundations for
political agreement, even if it did not make it superfluous. In any case, as things are
the political way is too ambitious.’81
On a different level again, a constitutionalist set of arguments in the law of
international organizations may take over the role of functionalism: as constitu-
tionalism is all about limited government, it might provide a novel justification for
legal constraints on the increasing and hence potentially intrusive or even abusive
activities of those organizations. This expectation is not shared by Jan Klabbers,
who has pointed out that the constitutional arguments will in this regard prob-
ably be as powerless as their precursor, the doctrine of functional necessity. Calls
for micro-constitutionalism in international organizations are, so the critique goes,
too single-mindedly focused on organizations as separate entities, in isolation from
their member states. Moreover, constitutional limitations can always be overcome
by agreement of precisely those subjectswhich they are supposed to control. Finally,
78. R. Monaco, ‘Le caracte`re constitutionnel des actes institutifs d’organisations internationales’, in Me´langes
offerts a` Charles Rousseau (1974) 153, at 154.
79. Legality of the Use by a State of NuclearWeapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep. 66, para. 19.
80. P.-M. Dupuy, ‘L’unite´ de l’ordre juridique international’, (2002) 297 Recueil des cours 15, at 227.
81. D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1944), 6 and 54, and Mitrany, The Progress of International Government
(1933).
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constitutional techniques are not able to meet the challenge of fragmentation.82
This is not the place to discuss these three objections in detail.83 Suffice it to point
out that the idea of constitutionalism includes awareness that the independent in-
ternational legal personality of international organizations is only the legal side of
a complex situation in which the member states play a dual role as parts of the
organization’s organs and as international legal subjects outside the organization.
State constitutions relate as well to the legal and the power aspects of states and can
do no more than design ‘auxiliary precautions’, as James Madison has put it,84 to
enable those in power to control themselves.
5.2. Constitutionalization of the EU and theWTO as spearheads
A particular case of constitutionalization of an international organization is the
example of the European Community/European Union. Many observers argue that
the EC/EU possesses a constitution in a material sense, independently of the non-
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty of 2004.85 However, the EC/EU is special,
notably because the EC has pronounced supranational features.86 Also, the EC/EU
is a regional entitywhich can build on a comparatively strong political and cultural
consensus and shared practices. Because of its unique characteristics, the constitu-
tionalization of the EC/EU is hardly suitable as amodel forworld-wide constitution-
alism. However, specific parts of the European debate, notably the discussion on the
democratic deficiency of European governance, may give impulses for the analysis
of democratic governance on a global scale.
In contrast, theWTOappears to pioneer not only themicro-constitutionalist ana-
lysis but even the macro-constitutional analysis of the entire international order as
such.However, in thefield there is still less agreement thanwith regard to theEC/EU
about the legal aspects whichmight constitutionalize theWTO. Themeanings and
connotations ascribed to the concepts of ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalization’
vary more than in the context of EU law, according to the authors’ scholarly discip-
line, their national background, and probably also their (trade-)political ideology.87
82. J. Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’, (2004) 1 International Organizations Law Review 31, at 44–5.
83. See on the problem of fragmentation infra, section 7.1.
84. Supra note 17.
85. See on the EU constitution J. Gerkrath, L’emergence d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Europe (1997); W. Hertel,
Supranationalita¨t als Verfassungsprinzip (1999); J. H.Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes Have
an Emperor?’, and Other Essays on European Integration (1999); C. Dorau, Die Verfassungsfrage der Europa¨ischen
Union: Mo¨glichkeiten und Grenzen der europa¨ischen Verfassungsentwicklung nach Nizza (2001); Peters, supra note
6; T. Schmitz, Integration in der supranationalen Union (2001); P. Ha¨berle, Europa¨ische Verfassungslehre (2006);
A. Verhoeven, The EU in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory (2002); T. Giegerich, Europa¨ische
Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im transnationalen Konstitutionalisierungsprozess: Wechselseitige Rezeption,
konstitutionelle Entwicklung und fo¨derale Verflechtung (2003); A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, Principles of European
Constitutional Law (2005); A. Lo´pez Pina, Europa, un proyecto irrenunciable: La Constitucio´n para Europa desde
la teorı´a constitucional (2004); P. Cruz Villalo´n, La Constitucio´n ine´dita: Estudios ante la constitucionalizacio´n de
Europa (2004); C. Philip, La constitution europe´enne (2004).
86. Supranationality is here understood as resulting from the wealth of the organization’s competencies, com-
pulsory adjudication, its law making powers without need for transformation by member states, and the
direct effect of many provisions of EC law.
87. See apart from the literature in the following footnotes the numerous works of E.-U. Petersmann, be-
ginning with Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law
(1991); most recently Petersmann, ‘Human Rights, Constitutionalism, and the WTO: Challenges for WTO
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Those diverse perspectives have recently been categorized as ‘rights-based’, ‘institu-
tional’, or ‘metaphysical’ approaches toWTO constitutionalization.88
Afirst aspect discussedunder theheading of ‘constitutionalization’ is the legaliza-
tion of dispute settlement, that is, the creationof a schemeof quasi-arbitrationbypanels
and the Appellate Body that replaces the former diplomatic means of settlement.
In this context, judicial norm generation by the Appellate Body has been called the
core element of WTO constitutionalization. It has been argued ‘that the case-law
of theWTO is beginning to display some characteristics ordinarily associated with
constitutional case law’, because it exhibits an explicit concernwith the delineation
ofpowers, borrowsconstitutional doctrines and techniques, suchasproportionality,
and has extended its scope into subject matters which were previously considered
to pertain to the domestic constitutional domain.89 Also, growing consideration by
the dispute settlement organs of non-trade issues such as human rights and environ-
mental protection has been praised as a genuinely constitutional approach, because
here the technique of balancing of interests is applied.90
Second, the traditional trade law principles of most-favoured nation and na-
tional treatment are increasingly viewed as two facets of a constitutional principle of
non-discrimination ultimately benefiting the ordinary citizens (importers, exporters,
producers, consumers, tax-payers). This view gives rise to the quest for a general
maxim of interpretation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
obligations ofWTOmember states (and the relevant exception clauses) in the light
of human rights guarantees.
A third ostensible factor of constitutionalization of WTO law is seen in one
of its core functions: international trade rules neutralize the domestic power of
protectionist interests.Theytherebyovercomethedomesticpoliticalprocessdeficiencies.91
This is a typically constitutional function, which is in the domestic realm served by
fundamental rights guarantees andby judicial protectionby constitutional courts.92
On the institutional level, reflection on the preconditions formajority voting in the
WTO requires a constitutional analysis.93
JurisprudenceandCivilSociety’, (2006)19LJIL633–67.See forotherapproachesH.SchloemanandS.Ohlhoff,
‘“Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in theWTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence’,
(1999) 93 AJIL 424–51; J. McGinnis and M. Movsesian, ‘The World Trade Constitution’, (2000) 114 Harvard
Law Review 511–605; M. Krajewski, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law’,
(2001) 35 Journal of World Trade Law 167–86; A. von Bogdandy, ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Dimensionen der
Welthandelsordnung’, (2001) 34Kritische Justiz 264–81; M. Hilf andW. Benedek, ‘Konstitutionalisierung der
Welthandelsordnung’, in (2001) 27Berichte derDeutschenGesellschaft fu¨r Vo¨lkerrecht 257–330 (Eng. summaries
at 281and326); S. Charnovitz, ‘WTOCosmopolitics’, (2002) 34NewYorkUniversity Journal of International Law
andPolitics299–354;D.C.Esty, ‘TheWorldTradeOrganization’sLegitimacyCrisis’, (2002)1WorldTradeReview
7–22; P. Gerhart, ‘The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization’, (2003) 24 University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 1; T. Cottier, ‘Konstitutionalisierungsprobleme im interna-
tionalenWirtschaftsrecht: VerfassungsrechtlicheHerausforderungen imRahmenderWTO’, inW.Ka¨lin and
T.Cottier (eds.),Die O¨ffnungdesVerfassungsrechts: Symposiumzum65.GeburtstagvonProf. Jo¨rgPaulMu¨ller, (2005)
recht Sonderheft 50–62. See also the contributions to the ‘Mini-Symposium’ in (2004) 7 JIEL, at 585 et seq.
88. D. Z. Cass, Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy and Community in the
International Trading System (2005).
89. D. Z. Cass, ‘The “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine
of Constitutional Development in International Trade’, (2001) 12 EJIL 39, at 42.
90. Cottier, supra note 87, at 56–7.
91. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions, supra note 87, Ch. V (at 96 et seq.).
92. J. Hart Ely,Democracy and Distrust (1980).
93. Cottier, supra note 87, at 57.
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Finally, and probably most importantly, the option of directly applying GATT
rules (which is currently still rejected by most courts) can be analysed in a consti-
tutional perspective. The capability of self-interested trade participants to enforce
international trade rules before domestic courts would empower the individuals
and would enable the judiciary to check the executives which otherwise enjoy un-
fettered discretion in applying the rules which were actually designed to restrain
those very actors. This is the classic theme of constitutionalism, which seeks to
contain political power in order to safeguard the autonomy of the individual.
6. LINKING THE NATIONAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSES
ON CONSTITUTIONS
The remaining task is to link the national lawyer’s understanding of constitutions
and constitutionalism (as sketched out in section 3) with the international lawyers’
discourse on international constitutionalization (as explained in sections 4 and 5).
6.1. Diagnosis: disjunction of the discourses
The first and important finding is that the national and international discourses
on constitutions and constitutionalism are basically unconnected.94 Constitution-
alization and constitutionalism in the international sphere so far seem to mean
something quite different from constitutionalism within states. Obviously some
implicit translation from the national to the international sphere has been per-
formed, but the terms of that translation are not clear. Moreover, many phenomena
which are discussed by international lawyers under the heading of constitutional-
ization may simply be called thicker legalization and institutionalization, without
any need to resort to the notion of constitution.
Moreover, the overall tendencies in international law could also be characterized
as an evolution from a civil-law-like system (‘horizontal’ relations between juxta-
posed, autonomous actors) to a more public-law-like system (strengthened central
authority, hierarchical elements, bindingness without or against the actors’ will).
This analysis does not altogether differ from the constitutionalist reading, because
the move from civil law to public law is mostly associated with the shift from
contract to constitution.
In order to connect the disjointed discourses, wemight try to apply the constitu-
tional scheme to international law in a stricter mode than usual.
6.2. Constitutional form?
As far as the first formal property of constitutional law is concerned, namely that it
is written, Bardo Fassbender and others have argued that the UN Charter is the
constitutional document of international law.95 The main justification for this
94. The quest for compensatory constitutionalism as formulated here of course includes the suggestion of
linking those two academic discourses.
95. B. Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (1998); Fassbender,
supra note 18, at 529–619; R. Macdonald, ‘The Charter of the United Nations in Constitutional Perspective’,
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construction is that the United Nations is the primary institutional representat-
ive of the international community, with quasi-universal membership. The United
Nations is therefore the (only) institution which furnishes the international com-
munity with organs.96
This conception has the advantage of being clear. On the other hand, the UN
Charter does not codify enough of what is fundamental for the functioning of
the international legal order. Rules of arguably constitutional importance are for
instance enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), or in
the Human Rights Covenants or the Genocide Convention. To qualify those texts
as ‘constitutional by-laws’ or as ‘incorporated’ into the Charter97 seems artificial.
To conclude, there is a lot of constitutional substance outside the UN Charter.
This means that a comprehensive constitutional document for the international
community is lacking.
The formal feature of supremacy is present on the international plane: jus cogens
is a specific, superior body of norms. It trumps conflicting international treaties98
and customary law.99 Jus cogens has therefore been qualified as ‘constitutional law
in a formal sense’.100
TheUNCharter itself constitutes a different,merely treaty-related, type of higher
law. According to Article 103 of the UN Charter, its provisions (and arguably sec-
ondary acts such as Security Council decisions) prevail in the event of a conflict
between the Charter obligations of member states and obligations under any other
agreement. But UN acts privileged by Article 103 of the UNCharter still rank below
jus cogens and would have to give way in case of conflict.101 Consequently a hier-
archy of norms within international law exists. However, only a small subset, and
not all international constitutional law, enjoys that precedence over ordinary inter-
national law. From a constitutionalist perspective this internal hierarchy is at least
as important as the external hierarchy, that is, the supremacyof all international law
in relation to domestic law. The explanation is that the supremacy of the entire body
of international law (including its highly technical provisions) over all domestic
law is not a constitution-like supremacy, but rather has a federal-law-like rationale
(the preservation of legal unity in matters regulated on the higher level).102
(1999) 20 The Australian Yearbook of International Law 205–31; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension
of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’, (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1–33.
PioneeringW. Jenks, ‘Some Constitutional Problems of International Organization’, (1945) 2 BYIL 11–72; A.
Ross, Constitution of the United Nations: Analysis of Structure and Functions (1950).
96. Fassbender, supra note 18, at 567–8.
97. Ibid., at 585 and 588.
98. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Art. 53.
99. ICTY, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Prosecutor v. Furundzˇija, (1999) 38 ILM 317, para. 153; ECHR, Al-Adsani v. United
Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, (2002) 23 HRLJ 39, para. 3, (Rozakis et al., Separate Opinion).
100. A. Fischer-Lescano, ‘DieEmergenzderGlobalverfassung’, (2003) 63Zeitschrift fu¨r ausla¨ndisches o¨ffentlichesRecht
und Vo¨lkerrecht 717, at 743–8.
101. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1993] ICJ Rep. 4, at 440,
para. 100 (Lauterpacht, Separate Opinion).
102. It is therefore less important that the ICTY went beyond the intention of the authors of the VCLT and held
that jus cogens also bars states from enacting countervailing national law (Furundzˇija, supra note 99, para.
155).
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With regard to the formal act of constitution-making by a pouvoir constituant in
a revolutionary act, we can identify – on the international plane – several ‘con-
stitutional moments’103 (such as 1945 or 1989). But on the whole, constitutional
development on the international plane seems to occur rather gradually. This cor-
responds to the concept of ‘constitution by evolution’ as favoured in some quarters
of constitutional theory.104
Overall, it seems difficult to speak of an international constitution in a formal
sense, because a complete constitutional charter is missing, no formal act of
constitution-making can be discerned, and the normative hierarchy is only rudi-
mentary.
6.3. Constitutional functions?
As for the constitutional functions, it seems fair to say that certain international
rules and principles fulfil those functions explained in section 3.2:105 the creat-
ive/constitutive function is fulfilled by the norms defining the subjects of international
law, such as the legal concepts of the state or of an international organization. The
organizational function is performed by themeta-rules on the sources of international
law, including those on treaty making or on the formation of customary law. An
example of the confining function is given by international human rights law, which
places important restraints on the exercise of governmental power over a state’s
own nationals. Political andmoral guidelines are offered by aspirational texts such as
the Human Rights Declaration or the Friendly Relations Declaration. The function
of (socio-psychological and/or institutional) integration is performed by norms of a
high symbolic value, such as the UN Charter.
However, the functional account provokes the question of how to distinguish the
constitutional laws of the international community from ordinary international
law, because ordinary law also performs some of those functions. Since a unified
constitutional charter is missing and because a normative hierarchy within the
international legalorder ispresent– if atall–only inrelationto thesmall subsetof jus
cogens, the option of establishing a clear distinction based on formal characteristics
is foreclosed. It remains possible to distinguish according to the substance of the
norms in question. Only those normswhich have ‘something fundamental’ to them
maybedulyqualifiedas constitutionalnorms, ashasbeen formulatedwith regard to
the British Constitution.106 But this distinction is inevitably blurry and contestable.
6.4. Constitutional values?
It is possible, but by no means compelling, to find a constitution in the third,
narrowest, value-loaded sense on the international plane.107
103. To borrow a term from B. Ackerman,We The People, Vol. 1: Foundations (1991).
104. Supra notes 25 and 26.
105. See already G. Scelle, ‘Le droit constitutionnel international’, (1933)Me´langes Raymond Carre´ deMalberg 501,
at 514; R. Uerpmann, ‘Internationales Verfassungsrecht’, (2001) 56 Juristen-Zeitung 565, at 567–9.
106. C. Turpin, British Government and the Constitution: Text, Cases andMaterials (2002), 5.
107. See sceptically W. Ka¨lin, ‘Der Menschenrechtsschutz der UNO: Ein Beispiel fu¨r die Konstitutionalisier-
ung des Vo¨lkerrechts?’, in W. Ka¨lin and T. Cottier (eds.), Die O¨ffnung des Verfassungsrechts: Symposium zum
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The ideal of democracy is being propagated in international law. One justification
for theconcernof international lawinthedemocratizationofstates is thedemocratic
peace thesis, as formulatedby ImmanuelKant inPerpetual Peace (1795),whichpoints
to the fact that ‘liberaldemocracies’ donotwagewaragainst eachother.108 (However,
the most powerful ‘liberal democracy’ very often does wage war against various
other types of regime.) In any case, numerous international legal provisions (both
universalandregional inscope)andimportantsoft-lawdocumentsgrant individuals
the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs and the right to vote in
elections,109 or generally call on states to establish democratic governments.110 But
despite these prescriptions with universal ambit, and despite the obvious spread
of liberal multi-party democracies after the collapse of the socialist bloc after 1989,
many states of the world, notably in the Arab and Asian regions, are not governed
democratically.111
Second, the international institutions themselveshardly satisfy the requirements
of democracy and of the separation of powers (or reasonably modified versions of
these basic ideas). For instance, the UN Security Council, due to its composition and
the power of veto which merely consecrates the power constellation in being after
the SecondWorldWar, is not a bodywhich in ameaningfulway represents the inter-
national community. In other international organizations as well, decision-making
is often lacking in transparency, the ‘parliaments’ of those organizations do not pos-
sess hard powers, and the decision-makers are not accountable to state parliaments
65. Geburtstag von Prof. Jo¨rg Paul Mu¨ller, (2005) recht Sonderheft 42, at 45. But see C. Tomuschat, ‘Die interna-
tionale Gemeinschaft’, (1995) 33 Archiv des Vo¨lkerrechts 1, at 7: There is a constitution of the international
community in which certain basics of peace and justice are laid down. See also E. deWet, ‘The Emergence of
International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional
Order’, (2006) 19 LJIL 611–32. See for a powerful analysis of the ‘relativity of the universal’ and the ‘univer-
sality of the relative’ in the current international legal order, and a call for ‘ordered pluralism’, M. Delmas
Marty, Le relative et l’universel (2004).
108. See for the claim that liberal principles and institutionsmakeadifference to the conduct of the foreignaffairs
of states M.W. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 205.
See for empirical evidence B. Russett, J. Oneal, and D. Davis, ‘The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace:
International Organizations andMilitarized Disputes, 1950–1985’, (1998) 52 International Organization 441–
67. The authors ‘find major benefits of joint democracy . . . If both members of a dyad are fully democratic,
conflict is 35 percent less likely’.
109. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 21; CCPR, Art. 25; ACHR, Art. 23(1); Banjul Charter, Art. 13(1).
110. See OAS Charter (last amended on 10 June 1993), Arts. 2(b), 9; Statute of the Council of Europe of
5 May 1949, Preamble; NATO Treaty of 4 April 1949, Preamble; CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe of
21 November 1993; Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/57/270 of
31 July 2002, Part V: ‘Human rights, democracy and good governance’, paras. 82 et seq.; UN Commission
on Human Rights, Res. 1999/57 of 27 April 1999, ‘Promotion of the right to democracy’; OAS Interamer-
ican Democratic Charter of 11 September 2001 (text in (2001) 41 ILM 1289); Resolution of the UN General
Assembly on the 2005 World Summit Outcome of 24 October 2005 (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1), para. 135: ‘We
reaffirm that democracy is a universal value . . . 136. We renew our commitment to support democracy
by strengthening countries’ capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy . . .’. See in
scholarship G. Fox and B. Roth (eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law (2000); S. Wheatley,
‘Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective’, (2002) 51 ICLQ 225–47; L. Ali Khan, A Theory
of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History (2003); J. I. Ibegbu, Right to Democracy in International Law
(2003).
111. Althoughnot always to be taken at face value, the surveys of ‘FreedomHouse’ are helpful to assess the degree
of democracy in countries around the world. See www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2005.html (last
visited 1 Sept. 2005).
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or to citizens.112 However, both the United Nations and the WTO are currently en-
gaged in serious efforts at some ‘democratization’ by improving transparency and
engaging national parliaments.113
An international rule of lawwouldprobably require someformof judicial review(or
other types of control of legality) of acts of states and other subjects of international
law. This is currently guaranteed only selectively.
In contrast, the endorsement of human rights comes closest to universal accept-
ance. About three quarters of the states (more than 140, of a total of 192 states) have
ratified the two universal Human Rights Covenants, and membership is steadily
and markedly increasing. However, there are important divergences in the inter-
pretation of the internationally enshrined human rights, and great deficiencies in
implementation.
All in all, the three traditional value-driven organizing principles of constitu-
tional government (democracy, human rights, and rule of law) are only tentatively
and selectively applied as international law prescriptions directed at states, and are
only spasmodically realized within international institutions. However, we have
seen that the emergence of public interest norms is considered to be a core ele-
ment of international constitutionalization. We might therefore call these norms
‘constitutional norms’. As already pointed out, these norms refer, for example, to
the protection of the environment or to free trade, but also to the protection of the
individual. This means that they do embody material values, albeit not necessarily
those of the classic canon of constitutionalism.
The upshot is either that the international legal order does not possess a full
constitution in the narrowest, legitimist sense or that its constitution suffers from
some legitimacy deficiencies.
6.5. Visualization as a loosely knit global constitutional network
All in all, considering both international and national law together, we can discern
fragmentary constitutional law elements at various levels of governance, in part re-
latingonly tospecificsectors (e.g.humanrights lawor trade law).Wemightvisualize
these elements as situated both ‘horizontally’ (sectorally) and ‘vertically’ (encom-
passing both the international and the national level). The constitutional elements
at the various levels and in the various sectors may complement and support each
other. I call this criss-cross a ‘constitutional network’. The term ‘network’, which is
currently in vogue in various disciplines, is used here to describe relationships and
interactionofnormsandof theirusers.114 Thenetworkpicture graphically describes
112. See E. Stein, ‘International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight’, (2001) 95 AJIL 489–534, on
democracy–legitimacy deficits in the World Health Organization (WHO), the WTO, the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the EU.
113. See, for the WTO, Hilf and Benedek, supra note 87, at 267–70; for the UN, Cardoso Report, supra note 67,
passim.
114. The notion of a ‘constitutional network’ does not describe an institutional design such as a ‘policy network’
(see J. M. Witte, W. H. Reinicke, and T. Benner, ‘Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public Policy Networks’,
(2000) 7 Internationale Politik undGesellschaft176–88); or ‘transgovernmentalnetworks’ (as inK.Raustiala, ‘The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International
Law’, (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 1–92; A.-M. Slaughter, A NewWorld Order (2004), esp. at
213–24), or a ‘public–private network’ as a bridge between the public and the private sector.
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relationshipsonan ideal scale betweenahorizontal/loose/market-like structure and
a hierarchical/institutionalized/state-like one. The construction of a transnational
constitutionalnetwork, inwhichtherelevantnormscannotbealigned inanabstract
hierarchy, has at least one important legal consequence: the resolution of eventual
conflictsbetween international andnational constitutional lawrequires abalancing
of interests in concrete cases.
7. ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS
The constitutionalist analysis of the international legal order would be incomplete
if it left out the antagonist trends which are visible in international law.
7.1. Fragmentation
First of all, many observers perceive the flourishing of sectoral regimes, such as inter-
national environmental law, international trade law, or international criminal law,
which is accompanied by a proliferation of specialized courts, as a threat to the
unity of international law. The constitutionalist reconstruction of international law
is often deemed to react first and foremost to this fragmentation.115
Fragmentation is certainly not a problem in itself.116 Legal problems (which
should, however, not be exaggerated) might be caused by contradictions, incongru-
ities, and conflicts of competencies whichmay stem from fragmentation. However,
a recent close examination of the structural developments in the different branches
of international law has revealed that the existing body of international law is far
from fragmented. It should rather be characterized as ‘unity in diversity’, or ‘flex-
ible diversity’.117 Actual contradictions and incompatibilities have so far occurred
extremely rarely.
The existing and potentially increasing diversity might, as a matter of fact,
render implausible the existence of a viable, single, overarching international
constitution.118 However, even sectoral constitutions, each of which display more
or less typically constitutional features, might be conceived as partial constitutions.
A small problem is that the idea of partial constitutions runs counter to traditional
constitutional theory and is rejected by some as an improper dilution of the term
constitution. This rejection is based on the assumption that a crucial feature of a
constitution is its totality. Indeed, the enlightenment quest for constitutional codi-
fication did not primarily seek themere writtenness of the constitution, but sought
to plan and order the edifice of government in one single document. Herein was
expressed the ‘conscious will to determine the political fate [of a community] in a
115. Some scholars have advanced the idea of constitutionalismas a bulwark against fragmentation, ‘as a promise
that there is some system in all the madness’. Cf. Klabbers, supra note 82, at 49.
116. Aptly putting into perspective these ‘threats’ are M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of Inter-
national Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, (2002) 15 LJIL 533 et seq.
117. R. Hofmann, ‘Concluding Remarks’, in A. Zimmermann and R. Hofmann (eds.),Unity and Diversity in Interna-
tional Law (2006), 491.
118. C.Walter, ‘Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance – Possibilities for and Limits to theDevelopment
of an International Constitutional Law’, (2001) 44German Yearbook of International Law 170, at 191–6.
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uniformfashion’.119 Thedemandfora ‘constitution in thesenseofplannedorderand
unity of the state’120 was a reaction to the multiple, decentralized, and overlapping
units of government in the Middle Ages. One of the driving forces of constitution-
alism was consequently the ‘idea that starting from one centre, the uniform State
should receive its basic design’.121
However, today even state constitutions have, due to globalization and multi-
level government, lost their capacity to regulate the totality of political activity
(as pointed out in section 1). Consequently, partial constitutions are no longer an
anomaly (if they ever were in political reality). And although fragmentation cannot
be stopped by evoking a nebulous constitutional paradigm, that approach might
encourage rather than hinder the development of rules of conflict between the
various and diverse subsystems. And this is what is needed in practical terms.
7.2. Softening of international law
The second anti-constitutionalist trend is the softening of international law. Instead
of creating formal, compulsory hard law, governments increasingly rely on soft
law.122 Soft law is not as such legally binding, but a commitment in the grey zone
between law and politics.123 For states, soft rules have the advantage that they are
quicker and easier to agree on, precisely because of their reduced bindingness. In a
constitutionalist perspective, soft legalization is laudable to the extent that it allows
a host of non-state actors to intervene and to act as co-law makers.124 Moreover, it
may pave the way to hard commitments even on the level of international consti-
tutional law: the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, with its principles of human rights and
democracy,125 is the most pertinent example of success in that direction. On the
other hand, soft law is anti-constitutional because it may undermine the normative
power of law as such.126 Most importantly, soft law leaves the states’ sovereignty
largely intact and thus fails to fulfil the core constitutional function of constraining
the most powerful actors.
Some observers may doubt that this softening runs counter to the idea of consti-
tutionalism. In fact, a similar softening tendency can be observed on the national
119. H. Heller, Staatslehre (1963 [1934]), 270 (author’s translation, emphasis added).
120. Ibid.
121. G. Jellinek,Allgemeine Staatslehre (1914), at 521 (author’s translation, emphasis added).
122. See in scholarly works, e.g., D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms
in the International Legal System (2000); J. Marquier, Soft Law: Das Beispiel des OSZE-Prozesses – Ein Beitrag
zur vo¨lkerrechtlichen Rechtsquellenlehre (2003). See, e.g., the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (ICOC) of 26 November 2002 with currently 109 subscribing states, available at
http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ460166 (last visited 1 June 2004).
123. But see K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, (2000) 54 International
Organization 421, distinguishing ‘soft’ from ‘hard’ law along the parameters of obligation, precision, and
delegation, whichmeans that there is a sliding scale between harder and softer norms.
124. See, e.g., the Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of January 2002, is-
sued by the so-called Wolfsberg group of leading international banks (available at http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com/standards.html (last visited 1 June 2004)). See also supra section 4.6. on non-state actors.
125. Final Act of 1 August 1975, Basket I, Questions relating to Security in Europe: Declaration of Principles
Guiding Relations between Participating States, Principle VII on human rights and fundamental freedoms,
available at http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm (last visited 1 June 2004).
126. See for a classic critique P.Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’, (1983) 77 AJIL 413–42
(orig. ‘Vers une normativite´ relative?’, (1983) 86 Revue ge´ne´rale de droit international public 5).
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plane. Modern state constitutions tend to be overloaded with non-justiciable, aspir-
ational, andhortatory articles. Overall, domestic law is softened by a proliferation of
voluntarynon-bindingagreementsbetweennationalauthoritiesand industry, codes
of conduct, and the like.On thedomestic level, that softeningmight indicate a strong
and mature normative order. In mature societies, not all relations need to be gov-
ernedby law, but somemaybe left to social discourse and informal commitments.127
However, it seems as if, at the international level, the softeningmust rather be inter-
preted as a sign ofweakness of the normative order (lack of consensus, reluctance to
give up authority and control). The global environment and policy domains appear
less secure and less transparent than the domestic environment, and therefore seem
to be in greater need of hard law to provide the necessary security and transparency.
7.3. US–American hegemony
The third anti-constitutionalist trend lies in the current sole superpower’s activities
on the borderline of international legality, notably in the fields of state jurisdiction,
international criminal law, human rights protection, treaty application, and the
use of force.128 First, the United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction both
in criminal and civil law matters in an exorbitant fashion.129 At the same time,
the United States prevents the exercise of universal jurisdiction by other states, for
exampleBelgium.130 On theotherhand,when it comes to restricting (not extending)
US activity, US jurisdiction is denied: US constitutional guarantees were long held
inapplicable toTalibanandalQaeda combatantswhohavebeendetained since 2001
in Guanta´namo Bay131 – although this territory is under ‘complete jurisdiction and
control’ of the United States by virtue of the 1903 Cuban–US Treaty.132 The United
Statesrefusesconsistentlytoratifyworld-ordertreaties, suchastheKyotoProtocolon
Climate Change. Moreover, it actively undermines the ICC. The obstruction policy
comprises bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs),133 a UN guarantee of immunity
to non-member states’ soldiers participating in UN peacekeeping activities,134 and
127. Shelton, supra note 122, at 12.
128. See in detail A. Peters, ‘The Growth of International Law betweenGlobalization and the Great Power’, (2003)
8Austrian Review of International and European Law 109–39.
129. For example, jurisdiction is claimed over European firms which seek to trade with Cuba. Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms Burton Act), P.L. 104–14, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm (last visited 1 Sept. 2005).
130. Universal Jurisdiction Rejection Act of 2003 (referred to the House Committee on International Relations
on 9 May 2003 (H.R. 2050)), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.R.2050 (last visited
27May 2004).
131. Judicial review denied byAl Odah v. US (consolidated with Rasul v. Bush), Judgment of 11March 2003, US Ct.
of App. DC Circ.; but see Rasul et al. v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004), granting habeas corpus review.
132. Agreement between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations of
23 February 1903, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/cuba/cuba002.htm (last
visited 27May 2004).
133. The exact number of BIAs (most of which were concluded under pressure) actually in force is currently not
verifiable. TheUS StateDepartment reports over 90 (signed) agreements. In some states a BIA is concluded as
anexecutiveagreementwhichdoesnotrequireratification.Ofthe90states,41areICCstateparties.See ‘Status
ofUSBilateral ImmunityAgreements’, availableathttp://www.iccnow.org/documents/USandICC/BIAs.html
(last visited 30March 2005).
134. UNDoc. S/RES/1422 (2002), prolonged for one year until 30 June 2004 by UNDoc. S/RES/1487 (2003). These
Security Council resolutions were adopted pursuant to the US threat not to prolong the deployment of its
forces in the peacekeepingmission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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national legislation explicitly prohibiting any co-operation with the ICC.135 In the
field of human rights policy, the United States conditions financial andmilitary aid
on recipient states’ human rights commitments in line with US guidelines, while
subjecting itself to only a handful of international human rights instruments.136 In
those few cases, the United Statesmakes ample use of reservations, and declares the
international instruments to be non-self-executing in the US courts. Finally, the US
doctrine of pre-emptive strikes does not appear to be covered by Article 51 of the
UNCharter. The USmilitary attack on Iraq in spring 2003 was justified neither by a
(revived) Security Council mandate nor by self-defence and was thus illegal.
The US posture of international law exceptionalism threatens international con-
stitutional principles, namely the prohibition of the use of force and the principle
of sovereign equality of states.137 Overall, the current factual US hegemony does not
correspond to the constitutional idea of checks and balances which might on the
international plane be a substitute for the ‘balance of powers’. This observation does
not mean that the East–West ‘balance’ until 1989 strengthened international law –
quite the contrary. Obviously, global checks and balances must be more subtle and
must encompass an institutional equilibrium. Finally and to avoid misunderstand-
ings, it is of course not claimed here that a world without the United States would
be better or more constitutionalized. The point made here is only that unequal
rights and unlimited powers run directly counter to the idea of an international
constitution.
8. TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONALIST RECONSTRUCTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The constitutionalist reading of current international law is to some extent an
academic artefact. It has a creative moment, simply because it lays emphasis on
certain characteristics of international law. But such an intellectual construct is
nothingunusual in legal practice. Ifweaccept thehermeneuticpremise that anaked
meaning of a text, independent of the reader, does not exist, then the reconstruction
of some portions of international law as international constitutional law is just an
ordinary hermeneutic exercise. It is no distortion of norms which are ‘objectively’
something else, but a legitimate formof interpretation. It is nomere deduction from
wishful thinking, but induced by manifold general developments in international
lawwhich have been discussed in sections 4 and 5.
This gaze at international law and related state behaviour through constitution-
alist spectacles has revealed amixed picture. On the one hand, the legal landscape is
severelymarredbyimportantanti-constitutionalist trends,notablybyUShegemony.
135. American Service Members’ Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA), entry into force 2 August 2002, Sec. 2002 and
2004 (repr. in (2002) 27 HRLJ 275).
136. ICCPR of 1966 (ratified in 1992, but not the optional protocol on individual communications); CERD of
1966 (ratified by the United States in 1994); CAT of 1984 (ratification in 1994 and acceptance of individual
communications to the Committee (under Art. 21 CAT)); Genocide Convention of 1948 (ratified by the
United States in 1988).
137. See on sovereign equality most usefully B. Fassbender, ‘Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International
Law’, in N.Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (2003), 115–43.
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On the other hand, some formal properties of constitutional law are present, the
typically constitutional functions are fulfilled, and some universal values are iden-
tifiable within international law. This means that – on a descriptive level – it is
not patently false to qualify some international norms and structures as a ‘consti-
tutional’ order. However, the question remains whether this qualification is, on a
prescriptive level, useful.
8.1. Some legal (and policy) consequences
So the ultimate question is which hard legal consequences andwhich policy effects
the image of a ‘constitutional network’ might have. One of the functions of the
paradigm is to serve as a guideline for the interpretation of textually open inter-
national norms. To give but one example, a constitutionalistVorversta¨ndnis supports
a restrictiveattitude towards reservations tohumanrights covenants,notably if they
curtail the respective control mechanisms. In a constitutionalist perspective, such
reservations are presumably incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty
in terms of Article 19(c) of the VCLT.138
Second, the constitutionalist paradigmmay influence the process of lawmaking
by the relevant political actors: constitutionalists welcome the proliferation of in-
ternational courts, tribunals and arbitral bodies, and the strengthening of judicial
review as a promising step towards further implementation of an international rule
of law.139
Or, to give another example, constitutionalist arguments can inform critique
directed at the lack of representativeness of the Security Council, they can confirm
the existence of legal boundaries of that organ’s (in)action, and they suggest that
the ICJ develop its role as an ‘international constitutional court’ by reviewing the
Security Council.140 Notably the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has, in the Tadic´ case, analysed the Security Council’s powers in a
constitutionalist perspective.141
Third, a constitutionalist outlook helps to unveil shocking failures of inter-
national institutions to implement the ideals of good governance, such as in the
UN-directed territorial administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.142
138. See for the full argument A. Peters, ‘International Dispute Settlement: A Network of Cooperational Duties’,
(2003) 14 EJIL 1, at 20–1. Another example of a constitutionalist reading of treaty clauses on judicial control
is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case no. 54, Ivcher Bronstein – Competencia, paras. 32–55;
Case no. 55, Caso del Tribunal Constitutional, paras. 31–54; both judgments of 24 September 1999, available
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/54-ing.html and http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/55-
ing.html (last visited 26 May 2004). Here the Court held that withdrawal from submission to jurisdiction is
onlypossible bydenouncing the treaty as awhole. TheCourt thereby transformed theoptional jurisdictional
clause into a quasi-compulsory one.
139. See on this issue G. Watson, ‘Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court’, (1993) 34 Harvard
International Law Journal 1–45; J. Klabbers, ‘Straddling Lawand Politics: Judicial Review in International Law’,
in R. MacDonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), TowardsWorld Constitutionalism (2005), 809.
140. See Fassbender, supranote 95, at 309–15; E. deWet,TheChapter VII Powers of theUnitedNations Security Council
(2004), esp. at 372–5. In this context, the constitutionalist approach to international organizationsmeets the
more general international constitutionalism.
141. Prosecutor v. Dusˇko Tadic´, CaseNo. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on theDefenceMotion for InterlocutoryAppeal on
Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, (1995) 16Human Rights Law Journal, esp. paras. 26–8.
142. G.Knaus andF.Martin, ‘Lessons fromBosnia andHerzegovina: Travails of theEuropeanRaj’, (2003) 14 Journal
of Democracy 60–74.
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Finally, the constitutional reconstructionofparts of international lawas constitu-
tional law has consequences for its ranking in relation to national law. Those norms
which can reasonably be qualified as having a constitutional quality may not be
summarily discarded in the event of a conflict with domestic constitutional law.143
On theotherhand, and this is important, the constitutionalist perspective (which
has been recast in this paper in order to strengthen international law) can be in-
strumentalized by international-law nihilists. Notably a group of US lawyers has
begun to use the notion of global constitutionalism in a novel way, mostly with the
intention of criticism.144 In that debate, ‘global constitutionalism’ appears to be as-
sociated with the fact that the entire international legal order has the (traditionally
constitutional) function of containment.145 In this perspective, international law
makes a kind of constitutional claim when claiming precedence over conflicting
domestic law. This claim is currently more or less openly rejected by some scholars
who doubt that states (concretely, the United States) should obey international law
(as a whole). (This is actually the background to Jed Rubenfeld’s proposition that
‘American constitutionalism’ is based on the idea of containment by domestic law
only, and not by international law.146) Their argument is that nations are bound by
international law only if it is legitimate.147 It is not surprising that this quest has
been formulatedonly recently. It is a consequenceof thenewglobalpolitical constel-
lation (the emergence of a ‘NewWorldOrder’with the expectationof a global spread
of democracy and rule of law after 1989), and a reaction to the fact that interna-
tional law has become stronger, denser, more important, and thus more ‘intrusive’
on national politics. The kernel of truth in the proposition of the illegitimacy of
international law is that the ‘old’ legitimacy of international law, flowing from the
will and consent of sovereign states, no longer satisfies political actors and citizens.
What is needed are ‘new’ types of legitimacy according to ‘constitutional’ standards.
This is indeed what global constitutionalism is about.
8.2. Objections to a constitutionalist reading of international law
Objections to the constitutionalist reading relate not only to the legal soundness of
the reconstruction, but also to arguably negative policy effects, while both levels of
argument cannot readily be separated.
One reproach is that international law lacks the ‘symbolic-aesthetic dimen-
sion’ which is inherent in national (constitutional) law.148 From this perspective,
143. See also supra section 6.5. on the network picture.
144. Cf. E.A.Young, ‘TheTroublewithGlobalConstitutionalism’, (2003) 38Texas International LawJournal527–45.
145. ‘Global constitutionalism,which is anawfullyvagueandpossibly sinister term . . . [means] that international
norms are increasingly called upon to play the role that constitutional principles play in the domestic legal
order’. Ibid., at 528.
146. Rubenfeld, supra note 14.
147. See, e.g., J. R. Bolton, arguing that international law is not (democratically) legitimate and therefore not really
law, which means that the United States is not legally bound by it (J. R. Bolton, ‘Is There Really “Law” in
International Affairs?’, (2000) 10 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1 et seq.). See on the other
hand M. Kumm for ‘constitutionalist’ arguments in favour of the legitimacy and thus of the bindingness
of international law (M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of
Analysis’, (2004) 15 EJIL 907–31).
148. U. Haltern, ‘Internationales Verfassungsrecht’, (2003) 128Archiv des o¨ffentlichen Rechts 511–56.
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constitutions have the prime function of storing the meaning of a political com-
munity. They embody revolutionary ideas not in an abstract fashion, but by (phys-
ical) sacrifice. Consequently, a constitution is genuinely ‘owned’ by a peoplemainly
because its meaning is transported by the sacrifice made for it.149 Because all this is
lacking on the international plane, the idea of international constitutional law is –
so the argument goes – a sham. However, this criticism appears to suffer from a
gender bias150 and risks overstating the importance of irrational and mythological
foundations of constitutional law. For example, the German constitution enjoys a
great reputation among German citizens, although nobody was sacrificed for it in a
physical sense in a war or a revolution.
Anothercriticismis that theconstitutionalist reconstructionfraudulentlycreates
the illusion of legitimacy of global governance. Constitutionalist language abuses
the highly value-laden term ‘constitutionalism’ in order to draw profit from its
positive connotations and to dignify the international legal order by it.However, the
danger that constitutionalism is misunderstood ‘as a mechanism that can instantly
bestow legitimacy’151 does not seem very real. International and constitutional
lawyers are sufficiently critical to realize that ‘constitutionalism’ is not a ready-
made answer, but – on the contrary – a perspectivewhichmight help to ask the right
questions.
Another important objection is that international law must content itself with
a more or less ‘symbolic constitutionalization’.152 The gist of this criticism is that
the constitutionalist reading of international law is not grounded in and backed
by a real common political will and corresponding power structures and sanctions
on the international level which would allow the enforcement of the international
constitution. The constitutionalist reading is too idealistic and does not adequately
reflect the realist calculus of governments. In the event of a problem or conflict,
any constitutionalist attitude will be given up, says this critique.153 For instance,
(Western) governments do not advocate universal human rights protection because
they believe that it is a good thing, but because they are exposed to internal pressure
from their constituencies to observe human rights standards and simply want to
prevent other states from having a competitive advantage by not being restricted
by human rights concerns. Likewise, the United Nations and other international
organizations are for most member states only a means for realizing their national
interests.154 However, constitutionalism is not dependent onmoral attitudes which
governments may or may not share. Constitutionalism may, in an epoch of inter-
dependence, further national, economic, and political interests at least in the long
run, because national and ‘public international interests’ tend to converge more
and more. Moreover, international constitutionalism has, as was pointed out at the
beginning of this article, both descriptive and prescriptive elements. It does not
149. Ibid., at 533–4, drawing on B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983).
150. Compare generally H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law (2000), at 18–22.
151. Klabbers, supra note 82, at 48.
152. M. Neves, Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung (1998).
153. Ka¨lin, supra note 107, at 47.
154. Ibid., at 49.
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merely claim to describe some features of the status quo of international relations,
but seeks to provide arguments for their further development in a specific direction.
It is therefore by definition ‘idealist’.
This leads to another objectionwhich asserts that constitutionalism is too apolit-
ical, and an unrealistic ‘promise of the end of politics’.155 However, law and politics
shouldnotbeviewedasdistinctrealms,butratherasstructurallycoupledsystems.156
Law is the product of political activity,whichhas beenfixed in order to organize and
limit (other) political action. In particular, constitutional law has traditionally been
characterized as a branch of law which is very close to politics.157 In consequence,
constitutionalism can, as in this paper, be conceived as a political, not an apolitical,
project (although it does suggest that there is a sphere ‘above’ everyday politics).
Another objection is that global constitutionalism is a palliative which serves to
obscure the elitist and aristocratic structure of international society and prevents
‘revolutionary social change’.158 This objection reminds one of the classic socialist–
Marxist critique of any type of liberal reform strategy. Without entering into this
old debate, it is readily admitted here that the constitutionalist approach indeed
implies that (international) law should be used as an instrument of evolutionary,
not revolutionary, change.Thebasicpremiseof this approach is that gradual reforms
are generally preferable to revolutionary ruptures in the course of which there is
a risk of the individual rights of the living being discarded, with the promise of a
better future for coming generations.
Afinal and probably crucial concern is that the concept of international constitu-
tionalism is toovagueand indeterminate. Thismaybedetrimental onvarious levels.
First, there is the danger that reliance on constitutionalism is actually counterpro-
ductive because itmay serve as a palliative andmaypostpone rather than encourage
concrete debates on concrete problems, such as decision-making in the WTO, the
composition of the UN Security Council, or how national parliaments can liaise
with the United Nations. Another aspect of the indeterminacy of the concept is its
malleability in the service of all kinds of political projects. We have seen that the
term is currently being usurped by US scholars with the intention of undermining
the authority of international law as a whole. And finally, if all law is somehow
‘constitutionalized’ and becomes more or less ‘constitutional’ or constitutionally
infused, then nothing is constitutional. It would therefore not be helpful to make
constitutionalismanabsolute.Comingback toWolfgangFriedman, it appearsplaus-
ible that patterns of coexistence and co-operation persist even in a generally more
constitutionalized world order.
155. Klabbers, supra note 82, at 47.
156. N. Luhmann,Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1993), at 407–39.
157. See, e.g., J. Isensee, ‘Verfassungsrecht als “politisches Recht”’, in J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds.),Handbuch des
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. VII (1992), 103.
158. P. Allott, ‘The Emerging International Aristocracy’, (2002) 35New York University Journal of International Law
and Politics 308, at 336. Allott continues, ‘The consoling Kantian myth that the republicanising of national
constitutions will naturally produce a constitutionalising of international society, a patchwork cosmopolis,
seems more improbable than ever. The UN Charter, an illusionary written constitution of international
society, was and is merely the groundwork of an international oligarchy of oligarchies’.
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8.3. Prospects and research agenda
Despite theproblematic aspectsmentioned,whichdeserve and compel further scru-
tiny, it is here suggested that the constitutionalist reconstruction of international
law merits further exploration because its benefits might outweigh the dangers.
First of all, it must be repeated that numerous constitutionalist stories are currently
being told in international legal scholarship. A single, uniform, consented constitu-
tionalist approach does not exist.
The constitutionalist reading, as suggested here, in no way implies the quest
for a world state. The idea is not to create a global, centralized government, but
to constitutionalize global (poly-archic and multi-level) governance,159 as defined
above.
Second, the constitutionalist approach to international lawmay help to prevent
uncontrolleddeformalizationof international law.160 ‘Deformalization’ iswhatMartti
Koskenniemi161 and others have called the resort to some ‘higher’ legitimacy argu-
ments in opposition to and in violation of international legality, as, for example,
in the Kosovo crisis.162 Although constitutionalism is a value-loaded concept, it is
nevertheless a legal approach in which consideration for the rule of law in a formal
sense, legal stability, andpredictabilityplay apart, andwhichacknowledges that leg-
ality itself can engender a type of legitimacy.163 Seen in this light, constitutionalism
is a juridical alternative to moralizing tout court.
Most importantly, the constitutionalist reading of the current international legal
process appears tohaveahealthycriticalpotential. Because the ideaof a constitution
is associatedwith the quest for a legitimate one, the constitutionalist reconstruction
provokes the pressing question of legitimacy of global governance. In consequence, the
constitutionalist reconstruction of international law may help rather than block
the revelation of existing legitimacy deficiencies in this body of law, which can
obviously no longer rely on state sovereignty and consent alone. On the other hand,
the constitutionalist reading should help to overcome statist expectations. It should
and could clarify the fact that legitimacy (however understood) of norms and of
political rule does not depend on exactly state-like structures of government or
governance.164 Ultimately, the constitutionalist reconstruction of international law
may help to promote a multi-level, genuinely global constitutionalism, whichmay
compensate for national constitutions’ growing deficiencies.
159. See for the notion of governance supra note 4.
160. Habermas, supra note 2, at 115.
161. M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2002), at 488–94; J. Petman, Human Rights and Violence: The
Hope and the Memory of the NewWorld Order (2007).
162. The Expert Commission with R. Falk and others qualified the Kosovo intervention as illegal, but legitimate
(Independent International Commission onKosovo,TheKosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons
Learned (2000), 185–98, esp. at 186).
163. Cf. R. von Ihering, Geist des ro¨mischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, Part II (1898), at
471: ‘Die Form ist die geschworene Feindin derWillku¨r, die Zwillingsschwester der Freiheit. Denn die Form
ha¨lt der Verlockung der Freiheit zur Zu¨gellosigkeit dasGegengewicht, sie lenkt die Freiheitssubstanz in feste
Bahnen, dass sie sich nicht zerstreue, verlaufe, sie kra¨ftigt sie nach innen, schu¨tzt sie nach aussen. Feste
Formen sind die Schule der Zucht und Ordnung und damit der Freiheit selber und eine Schutzwehr gegen
a¨ussere Angriffe – sie lassen sich nur brechen, nicht biegen.’
164. Kumm, supra note 147, at 929.
